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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
TRACY ALAN CANDELARIO, 
Defendant/Appellant• 
Case No. 940500-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1994). 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning - Due process of 
law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or 
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the 
land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual 
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any 
person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be 
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation. 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
section 1 provides: 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
United States and of the State wherein they reside. No 
1 
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Sec. 7 [Due Process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
Utah Code Ann. 76-3-203 (1995) provides in pertinent part: 
76-3-203. Felony conviction — Indeterminate term of 
imprisonment — Increase of sentence if firearm 
used. 
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be 
sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as 
follows: 
. . . . 
(2) In the case of a felony of the second degree, 
for a term at not less than one year nor more than 15 
years but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a 
facsimile or the representation of a firearm was used 
in the commission or furtherance of the felony, the 
court shall additionally sentence the person convicted 
for a term of one year to run consecutively and not 
concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence 
the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to 
exceed five years to run consecutively and not 
concurrently; 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Point. Whether the trial court erred in construing the 
firearm enhancement provision in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(2) to 
apply to Mr. Candelario's case? 
Standard of Review — Correctness. This issue is a question 
of statutory interpretation. This Court reviews the trial 
court's "statutory interpretation for correctness, according it 
no particular deference." State v. Masciantonio, 850 P.2d 492, 
493 (Utah App. 1993) (citing, State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 844 
2 
(Utah 1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Mr. Candelario was charged by information on December 15, 
1993, with one count of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302. Record on Appeal, 
("R.") at 9-10. At the time Mr. Candelario was arrested in this 
case, on December 13, 1993, he was on parole from a sentence of 
five years to life for a previous conviction. R. 29. Mr. 
Candelario had been committed to the Utah State Prison on that 
conviction on February 19, 1986, and was paroled on October 27, 
1992. 
Due to the instant charge, the Board of Pardons issued a 
warrant for Mr. Candelario's arrest and he was returned to the 
Utah State Prison on December 13, 1993. On February 23, 1994, 
Mr. Candelario appeared before the Board of Pardons for a parole 
violation hearing and the hearing was continued pending 
adjudication of this case. Id.1 
On June 24, 1994, pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. 
Candelario entered a plea of guilty to Robbery, a second degree 
felony and lesser included offense of Count I of the information. 
R. 19. The State agreed to recommend that his sentence be run 
concurrent with his previous five to life sentence, and agreed 
not to seek an additional sentence for "gun enhancement." Id. 
On June 24, 1994, Mr. Candelario appeared before the 
1
 Mr. Candelario's parole was apparently revoked. Transcript 
of Plea Hearing, held June 24, 1994, (hereinafter referred to by 
Court of Appeals record number), R. 68. 
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honorable Timothy R. Hanson, Third Judicial District Court Judge, 
to change his plea to guilty to count I of the Amended 
Information, charging Robbery, a second degree felony in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301. R. 61-72. Judge Hanson 
accepted Mr. Candelario's plea of guilty to one count of Robbery. 
R. 72. 
On July 22, 1994, Mr. Candelario was sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of one to fifteen years. The court also 
imposed a one year to be served consecutively under the provision 
in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203. The sentences were imposed to run 
concurrent with the five years to life sentence that Mr. 
Candelario was already serving. R. 30, 52-53. The Judgement was 
filed July 26, 1994. R. 30. Mr. Candelario filed a timely 
Notice of Appeal on August 2, 1994. R. 34. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At the time of Mr. Candelario,s guilty plea, the Information 
was amended to Robbery instead of Aggravated Robbery. The court 
also struck the language: "and in the course of a committing said 
robbery used or threatened the use of a dangerous weapon, to wit: 
a gun." Attached as Addendum A; R. 9, 61. 
In Mr. Candelario,s Statement of Defendant Certificate of 
Counsel and Order, he admitted that on November 30, 1993, he 
"unlawfully and intentionally took personal property in the 
possession of Hercules Credit Union from the person or immediate 
presence of Michelle Neff by the use of force or fear." Attached 
as Addendum B, R. 20. It was agreed by counsel for the State 
4 
I,hat there was in laci :> evidence of a firearm used by Mr. 
Candelario in the commissi on of the Robber -58. 
The following exchange occurred at lea 
heai ^ference to the gun enhancement: 
Ms. Wells [counsel for defense]: Your Honor, in this 
matter, we had been before you once before, and the Court had 
concern about whether or not a firearm enhancement applied. Mr. 
Jones and I have talked. Mr. Jones came over particularly for 
this matter, and we would indicate to the Court that I have 
amended the previously prepared statement of defendant to include 
the fact that any felony offense may include a gun enhancement, 
and I've added that on the second degree felony it would be a 
mandatory one year with a discretionary up to five years. So 
that has now become part of the bargain. 
I would indicate to you, however, that we — the matter has 
been amended to robbery for several reasons. One's the 
defendant's cooperation with police authorities on his own and 
other matters, and additionally, because in fact the robbery 
committed by Mr. Candelario included reference to a firearm, but 
there was in fact no firearm used. So we'll leave that to Your 
Honor for sentencing purposes, but with that explanation. But 
Mr. Candelario is now aware, and it has been included on this, 
that the Court must impose one year if you find certain things, 
and it can be a discretionary five. 
The court: So do I understand that ultimately what the 
facts of this case will show is that Mr. Candelario did not 
actually display a weapon, and in fact did not have one, but told 
someone he did? 
Ms. Wells: Yes. 
Mr. Jones [prosecutor]: Well, I thii ik that your assessment 
of what Ms. Wells says is correct. This is a situation where he 
goes into the bank, and tells the cashier he's got a gun, if she 
doesn't give him the money he's going to be [sic] kill her. She 
really thought he had a gun. In his confession later on, he 
indicates later on he was just trying to scare her. He didn't 
have a gun in his possession. That was primarily the factor that 
went into reducing this into a second degree. 
8. During the plea colloquy between the court and Mr. 
Candelario, the court asked Fh randelario a few questions 
related to the factual basis for Robbery, but risked H'u qu^ st ions 
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related to the factual basis for the gun enhancement: 
The court: Mr. Candelario, under the amended information 
where you're charged with robbery, a second degree felony, there 
are certain factual bases, or elements that make up that charge. 
I'm going to discuss each on of those with you and ask you to 
listen carefully to the following, because by pleading guilty 
you're telling me the following things are true. First, that the 
crime occurred at 3141 West 4700 South here in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. Secondly, the crime occurred on or about November 
30th of 1993. The third element is that you were the person that 
committed the crime. The substance of the offense is that you 
unlawfully, and intentionally, that means you had no legal basis, 
and you knew that, and went ahead anyway, took personal property 
from the possession of Hercules Credit Union form the person, or 
immediate presence of Michelle Neff. And that's a lot of fancy 
language meaning you went into Hercules Credit Union, and 
demanded money or other property from them, and you didn't have 
any right to that. Do you understand that? 
Mr. Candelario: Yes, Your Honor. 
The court: And also that you did it in the immediate 
presence — that you confronted Michelle Neff, and demanded the 
money or property from her. Do you understand that? 
Mr. Candelario: Yes, Your Honor. 
The court: Did those things occur? 
Mr. Candelario: Yes, Your Honor. 
The court: It says here $2,000. Is that right? 
Mr. Candelario: Yes, Your Honor. 
R. 66-67. The court then continued with other questions related 
to the voluntariness of the plea. R. 67-69. 
At Mr. Candelario's sentencing hearing, the following 
exchange occurred between counsel for Mr. Candelario and the 
court regarding the gun enhancement: 
Ms. Wells: One other thing. It was charged as an 
aggravated robbery, because there was an illusion [sic] to a 
firearm. As we discussed at the last hearing, there is no 
indication, and I believe Mr. Jones substantiated that, that 
there was in fact any firearm. And so although it was originally 
charged that way, and he made reference to one, we, as a group, 
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believe that one did no t exist, and hopefully that will have some 
bearing on your decision as we2 1 
The court: But it doesn't change the necessity of imposing 
an enhancement of a firearm. 
Ms. Wells: I think that is within your discretion at this 
point, because it is still there. We acknowledge it was there, 
but I think you would have to feel that there was a factual basis 
for it in order to actually impose it. I leave that to your 
discretion. I know we've gone over this before, but what Mr. 
Jones said at the time was that, you know, we acknowledge that 
the offense carries it, but in actuality we have no evidence that 
one was utilized. 
The court: The firearms enhancement applies if a person 
makes a representation that they have a firearm, even if they do 
not. 
Ms. Wells: ii does for purposes of elevating the offense to 
aggravated robbery, yes. For purposes of an enhancement, I think 
that that is less clear, and becomes discretionary. 
The Court: Mr. Blaylock. 
Mr. Blaylock [prosecutor]: Mr. Jones' comments are that the 
defendant told the cashier he had a gun, but he never showed her 
a gun, that we were willing to let him plead guilty to robbery, 
as second degree felony, because a gun was not exhibited. He 
says under 76-3-203(2) the Court can enhance the sentence, that's 
an additional one year, and may add five years if the Court 
determines that a firearm was — he put in quotation marks — 
used in the commission of the offense. He says, in confessing, 
he said the defendant wanted the cashier to believe he had a gun. 
The court: That's the whole point of the enhancement, not 
whether you've got one, whether you tell somebody you have. What 
difference does it make? 
R,,, 4 9-50. 
Ultimately, the court riil ed as follows: 
Sounds to me like an ideal question for one of the 
appellate courts \ consider. I can't see a dime's 
worth of difference if you're the person standing there 
being robbed where a person represents they have a 
firearm, or whether or not it's displayed, they believe 
you, the fear is still there. I suppose there's a lot 
of aggravated robberies that don't result in a 
shooting. We all know how I feel about firearms. You 
use a firearm, you get an enhancement, or if you 
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represent you have one. If that's wrong, the appellate 
courts can figure a way to get around the statute. But 
that doesn't change my mind about it. The fact that 
there wasn't one may have some impact on whether or not 
this sentence should run consecutively to what he's 
already doing. Is there anything further? 
R. 51. The court then imposed the gun enhancement as a one year 
consecutive sentence to the one to fifteen year sentence for the 
robbery. R. 52. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court improperly interpreted the language of the 
firearms enhancement provision in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(2) 
("Enhancement Statute"), providing for an enhanced penalty when 
"a firearm or a facsimile or a representation of a firearm" is 
used during the commission of a felony, to apply to the present 
case. Specifically, the trial court improperly construed the 
Enhancement Statute by concluding that a threat made by Mr. 
Candelario, stating he had a firearm, was a "representation of a 
firearm." 
The plain language of the Enhancement Statute, as well as 
the legislative history behind it, shows that the Legislature 
intended the language "representation of a firearm" to mean a 
"likeness" of a firearm rather than a simple statement or threat 
that a defendant possesses or will use a firearm. 
Any ambiguity in the meaning of the Statute should be 
resolved in favor of Mr. Candelario. The firearm enhancement 
portion of Mr. Candelario's sentence should therefore be vacated. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT
 I M p R 0 P E R L Y CONSTRUED THE LANGUAGE IN 
THE ENHANCEMENT STATUTE, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203 AND 
THEREFORE IMPROPERLY ENHANCED MR. CANDELARIO'S 
SENTENCE. 
A. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE ENHANCEMENT STATUTE REVEALS 
THAT THE LEGISLATURE INTENDED THE PHRASE, "REPRESENTATION OF A 
FIREARM," TO MEAN A "LIKENESS" OR "IMAGE" OF A FIREARM RATHER 
THAN A STATEMENT THAT THE DEFENDANT POSSESSES A FIREARM. 
W1H?I« J« fi» prprpf i tui "he language of a statute, this Court will 
first look he statute's plain language-* .yurl - ill "resort to 
other methods of statutory interpretation only it tlie ! ai'iguacje is 
ambiguous " State v. Masciantonio, 850 P.2d 442, 4 93 (Utah 1993) 
(citing, Vigil, 8*° ° ~>* at ;5). "A statute is ambiguous if it 
can be understood by reasonably well-informed persons re 
differen ," Tanner v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 799 P. 2d «2Jl, 
233 (Utah App. 1990). In order to give ctlerl in I:he legislative 
intent of the language in question, the reviewing court assumes 
that -i-t^  Legitblal HI e 'Vised each term advisedly/1 and rtgive[s] 
effec ) each term according to its c UK! incepted 
," Masciantonio, 850 P.2d (citing, Versluis v. 
Guaranty Nat'l. Cos.
 f 84 2 I'" ;,.":d 8 , oo / ^ l -' ^° • ) • 
'••-.•' specific language to be examined i Utah code 
Vb-3-203(2) (Replacement 'volume 1995), which provides in 
pertinent part: 
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be 
sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as 
follows: 
(2) In the case of a felony of the second degree, for 
a term at not less than one year nor more than 15 years 
but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile 
or the representation of a firearm was used in the 
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commission or furtherance of the felony, the court 
shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a 
term of one year to run consecutively and not 
concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence 
the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to 
exceed five years to run consecutively and not 
concurrently; 
(Emphasis added). There is no evidence in the record that a 
firearm, or a facsimile of a firearm was used by Mr. Candelario 
during the robbery. The court relied on the term "representation 
of a firearm" to enhance Mr. Candelario's sentence. Therefore, 
the question is whether, pursuant to that language, Mr. 
Candelario's sentence can be enhanced based only on his threat, 
telling the bank employee that he had a gun. 
In order to determine the plain meaning of the terms used in 
a statute, courts generally rely on the usual and accepted 
meanings found in a dictionary. State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 
845 (Utah 1992); State v. Masciantonio, 850 P.2d 492, 494 (Utah 
1993); State In Interest of J.L.S., 610 P.2d 1294, 1295 n. 4 
(Utah 1980); State v. Paul. 860 P.2d 992, 993-94 (Utah App. 
1993). Accordingly, Webster's New World Dictionary, Third 
College Edition (copyright 1994) (hereinafter, "Webster's") 
defines "representation" as: 
1 a representing or being represented (in various 
senses); specif., the fact of representing or being 
represented in a legislative assembly 2 legislative 
representatives, collectively 3 a likeness, image, 
picture, etc. 4 [often pi.} a description, account, or 
statement of facts, allegations, or arguments, esp. one 
intended to influence action, persuade hearers, make 
protest, etc. 5 the production or performance of a 
play, etc. 6 Law a statement or implication of fact, 
oral or written, as made by one party to induce another 
to enter into a contract 
10 
ia JJUXU uj:^ original),2 Definitic lumbers n
 f 2, 
-r • • n be imme< f> ru] ed on t, as they i **-r - specific 
meanings and contexts that are obviously not appi„ .e 
.estion. That leaves two possibilities, definitions 
and • -~ach having different Kiean i rigs. However, neither refer 
w.w ci "threat" -* statement "threatening" a person. 
I determine which meaning the legislature 
intended, this Cour4" w i n cor* representation" with 
the assumption that - . . ".•:..- advisedly and that the intent of 
the Legislatur e i s evealeu ±ii - .< if the term in the context 
and structure in which it is placed." Paul. J *>.2d at 994 
(emphasis In original). Examining the term "representati on" in 
the "coin.eat ami «,1 ruci lire in which ' --- placed/1 It is used Ln 
the disjunctive and is placed aftt ** •  s "I irearm, 01 1 
facsimile . . . ."" § 36-3-203. Webster's defines "facsim 
as: 
1 (an) exact reproduction or copy 2 the transmission 
and reproduction of graphic matter by electrical means, 
as by radio or wire 
(bold type in oriq 111a I )i - •• at ^6o. 
Therefore, examined J context, of - oosed 
i n Webster • representation,11 only definition number 3, a 
"likeness" ' i s cor isi stei it wi th the other terms in the 
Enhancement Statute. A "likeness" > . 'image" ml .1 lirearm JN 
2
 The designation [often pi.] which appears prior to 
definition number 4, is a designation used by the editor to note 
that it is often the plural form of the word that has the meaning 
given in that definition. Webster's, (foreword entitled "Guide to 
the Use of the Dictionary"), at XV. 
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different from an "exact reproduction," just as a "facsimile" or 
"exact reproduction" of a firearm is different from an actual 
firearm. The legislature therefore intended that the definition 
for "facsimile," ("exact reproduction"), provided for instances 
where a replica of a firearm is used, whereas, the definition of 
"representation" provided for instances where a person creates a 
"likeness" or "image" of a firearm other than a replica. A mere 
statement that a person possesses a firearm does not fit within 
the clear meaning of the language and context of the Enhancement 
Statute. 
In Paul, this Court stated: 
[W]e have nothing to do with what the law ought to be. 
We must be guided by the law as it is. We cannot by 
construction liberalize the statute and enlarge its 
provisions. When language is clear and unambiguous, it 
must be held to mean what it expresses, an no room is 
left for construction. 
Paul, 860 P.2d at 994-95 (quoting, Hanchett v. Burbidge, 202 P.2d 
377, 380 (Utah 1921)). The Legislature could have easily added 
the language, "or a threat of the use of a firearm." Indeed, 
similar language is used in the Aggravated Robbery statute, § 76-
6-302, which provides in pertinent part: 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the 
course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as 
defined in Section 76-1-601; 
. . . . 
The Aggravated Robbery statute was adopted in 1973 and, 
therefore, the Legislature must have known of its existence in 
1976. Yet, there is no language in the Enhancement Statute 
regarding the mere threat of the use of a firearm. The language 
12 
it; very f»pe iiu and its context does not allow for a definition 
for the term "representat i on" l.lwit in any w«i\ equates to a mere 
"threat," 
Ac :'. . y, where as here, the language, context, structure 
and use of terms in other statutes si IOW tit iat t .1 ie 1 legislature 
intended the word "representation" to mean a "1 ikeness" or 
"inuigo," IJ,»O trial cour t erroneously "liberalizefd]" the meaning 
of the Enhancement Statute to include- a st ateiivont m, threat by 
the defendant that he had a firearm. See Paul. 860 d »+• Q94. 
B. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ENHANCEMENT STATUTE 
SUPPORTS MR, CANDELARIO'S PROPOSED CONSTRUCTION AND DISPELS ANY 
AMBIGUITY IN THE TERM "REPRESENTATION." 
The legislative history of the Enhancement Statute support's 
Mr. Cano construction of the phrase, 
"representation of; a firearm " The language uttdct cnnsiiierat \ on 
came from an amendment ». w , , , made by Senator Rinstrom 
during the session. During the floor 
debate Ln the Senate, Senator Rinstrom explained th*-? scope ol the 
amendment: 
Ser pinstrom: Now, Mr. President, a second motion x would have 
to amend this bill [H.B. 3] as follows is again in 
those same places, calling your attention to line 
18 after the word "firearm," add these words: "or 
a facsimile or the representation of the same was 
used in the commission or furtherance of a 
felony." 
Mr. President: Or a facsimile or what? 
•Sen, Hinsstrom: "or a facsimile or the representation of the 
same.11 Now, let me give you the example of where 
I'm going. Sorry to report I represented a young 
man on an armed robbery charge. I was successful 
in finding him innocent. He later was arrested on 
a second one and confessed to eighteen armed 
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robberies including the one that I had represented 
him on, and he'd all done it with a cap pistol. 
But the people at the other end of that barrel 
didn't know what they were facing, and they were 
just as in great a shock and trauma as if a real 
gun had been pointed to them. So I think that we 
ought to include a facsimile. Or, this would also 
include the man who has his hand in his pocket and 
points it at vou and says, lfI have a gun here, and 
if you don't hand over the cash, I'm going to 
shoot you." So, what this amendment would do is 
saying that if a person uses a gun, its facsimile, 
or represents that he has a firearm, he could 
equally be sentenced to an additional five years. 
That's the purpose of the amendment. (emphasis 
added) 
Mr. President: Senator Brockbank. 
Sen. Brockbank: (inaudible) representation of same to 
representation of a firearm. 
Mr. President: That's good. That's a good suggestion. 
Sen. Brockbank: Because I think you might refer back to a 
facsimile. 
Mr. President: That's right. That's right. 
Sen. Brockbank: (inaudible) to firearms. 
Sen. Rinstrom: And the representation of a firearm. 
Mr. President: And that will also have to go into all three 
places? 
Sen. Rinstrom: That's correct. 
Mr. President: Okay. That carries a bit more significance than 
the other one, I would think, if it (inaudible) 
some gesture on the part of the person as opposed 
to carrying a real firearm. 
Sen. Rinstrom: I might say that this bill does not deal just with 
robberies. It's the commission of any felony in 
which a firearm would be used, a facsimile or the 
representation. 
Mr. President: Would this be a representation. 
Sen. Rinstrom: I don't think if you pointed your finger at me 
that that would be a representation. 
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But— (emphasis added) 
Mr, President: It might look like a gun— 
Sen. Rinstrom: Well— 
Mr. President: to somebody in the dark. 
Sen. Rinstrom: I think a reasonable man, if he was seeing that. 
would not conclude that you had a firearm. If you 
came up behind me at night and stuck your finger 
in your back and said. "This is a gun. If you 
don't hand me your wallet. I'm going to shoot 
you.11 that would be a representation, yes. 
(emphasis added) 
Senate Budget Session. Senate Floor Debate on House Bill 3. 
Amendment number 2. January 26. 1976. Senator Rinstrom7s Second 
Amendment. (transcribed and attached as Addendum C), at pp. 1-2. 
During the House Debate of Senator Rinstrom's second 
amendment, Representative Hansen explained: 
Mr. Speaker, I've reviewed this and what, in effect, it 
is, if you use a facsimile of a gun or you put your 
finger in the back of someone and say it is a gun or 
hold your coat or something similar to that, the same 
sentence could be imposed upon a felon who did that. I 
think its effect strengthens the Bill and I would make 
the motion that we accept the amendment of the Senate. 
Legislative Budget Session. Day 16. House Floor Debate on Senate 
Amendments to House Bill 3. January 27. 1976. transcribed and 
attached hereto as Addendum D, p. 1. 
The examples used during the floor debate further support 
Mr. Candelario#s proposed definition of "representation." The 
first example used by Senator Rinstrom referred to a person who 
put their hand in their pocket, making it look like a gun, which 
is consistent with the "likeness" or "image" definition. During 
the floor debate, the Senate President apparently pointed his 
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finger like a gun and asked whether it was a representation. 
Senator Rinstrom replied that a reasonable person would not 
conclude that the President's finger was a firearm. Senator 
Rinstrom continued with another example: 
If you came up behind me at night and stuck your finger 
in your back and said, "This is a gun. If you don't 
hand me your wallet, I'm going to shoot you," that 
would be a representation, yes. 
Senate Debate at 2. Again, the example given is of a person 
creating a "likeness" or "image" of a gun. 
Both the Senate and House debates show that the Legislature 
intended that the amendment to H.B. 3 apply only where either a 
replica (under the term "facsimile"), or a "likeness" or "image" 
(under the term "representation") of a firearm was used, which a 
reasonable person would believe was a firearm. There was no 
discussion regarding a mere threat or statement that a defendant 
possessed a firearm. The clear intention was that the term 
"representation" referred to the creation of a "likeness" or 
"image" of a firearm. 
C. UNDER THE WELL ESTABLISHED RULE OF LENITY, ANY POSSIBLE 
AMBIGUITY IN THE MEANING OF THE PHRASE, "REPRESENTATION OF A 
FIREARM," MUST BE CONSTRUED IN FAVOR OF MR. CANDELARIO. 
It is a "well established" rule in criminal cases that any 
ambiguity in a statute must be resolved in favor of the 
defendant. State v. Egbert, 748 P.2d 558, 562 n. 3 (Utah 1987) 
(dissenting opinion by Justice Durham); Accord Simpson v. United 
States, 435 U.S. 6, 14-15, 98 S.Ct. 909, 55 L.Ed.2d 70 (1978) 
("ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be 
resolved in favor of lenity.") 
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Mr. Candelario has proposed the most logical and reasonable 
construction of the Enhancement Statute that is consistent with 
its plain language, context, and legislative history. His 
construction is also consistent with the United States Supreme 
Court's stated "reluctance to increase or multiply punishments 
absent a clear and definite legislative directive." Simpson, 435 
U.S. at 15-16. The trial court's conclusion that the term 
"representation" applies to a threatening statement, with no 
showing of any "likeness" or "image" of a firearm, is not 
consistent with the plain language of the statute, its context or 
its legislative history. Even if the trial court's construction 
raises another meaning, creating ambiguity in the term 
"representation," that ambiguity must be construed in favor of 
Mr. Candelario's proposed construction. 
When read in context with the other language of the 
Statute, the language is unambiguous in its meaning as a 
"likeness" or "image" of a firearm. Had the legislature intended 
that merely making a statement threatening to use a firearm, 
creating no "likeness" or "image," it could easily have included 
such language. It did not, however, and this Court should not 
broaden or "liberalize" the terms of the Enhancement Statute. 
Cf. Paul, 860 P.2d at 994. Rather, this Court should construe 
any possible ambiguity in favor of the reasonable construction 
proposed by Mr. Candelario. 
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REASONS SUPPORTING ARGUMENT/PUBLISHED DECISION 
Due to the complex nature of the issue involved, and the 
lack of existing case law interpreting the firearms Enhancement 
Statute under these circumstances, Mr. Candelario believes that 
oral argument will materially assist this Court in the resolution 
of this Appeal. Mr. Candelario therefore respectfully requests 
oral argument before this Court and requests that a published 
decision be issued. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, Mr. Candelario 
respectfully requests that this Court vacate the one year 
enhancement to his sentence imposed by the District Court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2AJJL day of May, 1995. 
D a v J i F ^ 
^At€orney for Defendant/Appellant 
Robert K. Heineman 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, David V. Finlayson, hereby certify that I have 
caused eight copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah 
Court of Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84102, and four copies to the Attorney General's 
Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 
3d±L day of May, 1995. 
Dav^d^V. /Finlayson 
DELIVERED/MAILED this day of May, 1995. 
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ADDENDUM A 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
ERNEST W. JONES, Bar No. 1736 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Screened by: E. JONES 
Assigned to: E. JONES 
BAIL: NO BAIL 
I N F O R M A T I O N 
Case No. 
9310/7**3 FS 
The undersigned Det. Don Garner - Salt Lake County Sherifffs 
Office, under oath states on information and belief that the 
defendant, committed the crime of: 
COUNT I *~W<-A 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a Pairafe Degree Felony, at 3141 West 4700 
South, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about 
November 30, 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, 
Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that 
the defendant, TRACY ALAN CANDELARIO, a party to the 
offense, unlawfully and intentionally took personal property 
in the possession of Hercules Credit Union from the person 
or immediate presence of Michelle Neff, and in the oouroe of 
rnmmitting—oaid—rubbmy used—w?—threatened—the—*ase—of—et 
• dangeroua weapon, to-wits—a gun-. 
NO BAIL REQUEST: The defendant TRACY ALAN CANDELARIO is 
currently on Parole for another felony to-wit: Aggravated 
Robbery. Therefore, pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Utah 
Constitution, it is requested that the defendant be held without 
bail on the above charge. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
TRACY ALAN CANDELARIO, 
DOB 7/13/66 
OTN 7155575 
Defendant. 
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INFORMATION 
STATE OF UTAH v, TRACY ALAN CANDELARIO 
County Attorney No. 93 001241 
Page 2 
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
Det. James Glover, Det. Don Garner, Mark Holding, Michelle 
Neff and Penny Christensen. 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Your affiant based this information on police report no. 93-
154168. 
The Defendant admitted to Detective James Glover that he 
entered the Hercules Credit Union and robbed Michelle Neff, a 
cashier, of $2,000.00. The Defendant told Ms. Neff he had a gun. 
The Defendant was identified by Ms. Neff from a photo 
spread. 
JL DET. M30N GARNER 
A f f i a n t 
Subscribed and sworn to before 
me this / *T day of December, 
1993. 
MAGISTRATE. ,,.,- , . 
Authorized for presentment and filing: \ V^i;^^!^ 
DAVID E. YOCOM, County^Attorney 
sptrcy County Attorney De| .... . ^ 
December 15, 1992 
msy/93 001241 ' 
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ADDENDUM B 
FILED 8I37H3S7 C0WS7 
Third Judicial District 
J o * I Z» ^ 4 
*eptJly <Sk 
In The Third Judicial District Court Of Salt Lake County 
State of Utah 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
r) TSofonA Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
AND ORDER 
Crimina! No. f f / ^ ^ S V = S 
COMES NOW, , the defendant in this case and 
hereby acknowledges and certifies the following: 
I have entered a plea o/(guilty>'(no contest) to the following crime(s): 
CRIME & STATUTORY 
PROVISION 
DEGREE PUNISHMENT 
min/max and/or 
B. ",tMAJ; A UJUfJ/ Ift/JUL
 r , r . ,~,~ ,, ,,^^ ~,^^^ 
/ / rJjiAA^ "77^r SQ<?JU^ jL^tUtz****-^ 
tt>on 
I have received a copy of the (charge) (ljiformation) against me, I have read it, and I 
understand the nature and elements of the offense(a)^r whiclj pleading (guilty) (no 
contest). -^^t^^^^ J 
The elements of the crime(s) of which I am charged are as follows: ^ t&L *l~ 
* Mycorrduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally liable, that 
constitutes the elements of the crime(s) charged are.as follows: 
(D/.j ft? #J?*-&t<J' til24 114 six $41 / / / <7-7^ 
ftbAfrti te MvMissi.ftftc rX^syUj^ ^^/&yJiM&_ 
' ^Ty^n enl£nrtg mK/tnes^fjIe^) vo^iarilj/arid wTth knowledge and understanding of 
the following facts: 
1. I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I 
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I recognize 
that a condition of my sentence may be to require me to pay an amount, as determined by 
the Court, to recoup thexost of counsel if so appointed for me. 
2. I (fiave not) (have) waived my right to counsel . If I have waived my right to 
counsel, I have cfcrnTso knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily for the following reasons: 
00020 
(£l*^t&l 
3. If I have waived my right to counsel, I have read this statement and under-
stand the nature and elements of the charges, my rights in this and other proceedings and the 
consequences of my plea of guilty. 
\i I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is 
., and I have had an opportunity to discuss this statement, my rights and 
the consequences of my guilty plea with my attorney. 
5. I know that I have a right to a trial by jury. 
6. I know that if I wish to have a trial I have the right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses against me or to have them cross-examined by my attorney. I also know 
that I have the right to compel my witness(es) by subpoena at State expense to testify in court 
in my behalf. 
7. I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf but if I choose not to do 
so I cannot be compelled to testify or give evidence against myself and no adverse inferences 
will be drawn against me if I do not testify. 
8. I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me I need only plead "not 
guilty" and the matter will be set for trial. At the trial the State of Utah will have the burden 
of proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a 
jury the verdict must be unanimous. 
9. I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I were tried and convicted 
by a jury or by the judge that I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to 
the Utah Court of Appeals or, where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court, and that if I could 
not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, those costs would be paid by the State. 
10. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each offense to which 
I plead (guilty) (no contest). I know that by pleading (guilty^ (no contest) to an offense that 
carries a minimum mandatory sentence that I will be subjecting myself to serving a minimum 
mandatory sentence for that offense. I know that the sentences may be consecutive and may 
00021 
be for a prison term, fine, or both. I know that in addition to a fine, a (twenty-five [25%]) 
(eighty-five [85%]) surcharge, required by Utah Code Annotated 63-63a-4, will be imposed. 
I also know that I may be ordered by the Court to make restitution to any victim(s) of my 
crimes. 
11. I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive periods, or the fine for 
additional amount, if my plea is to more than one charge. I also know that if I am on 
probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been convicted 
or to which I have pled guilty, my plea in the present action may result in consecutive 
sentences being imposed upon me. ^ -^ 
12. I know and understand that by pleading^guilty) (no contest) I am waiving my 
statutory and constitutional rights set out in the preceding paragraphs. I also know that by 
entering such plea(s) I am admitting and do so admit that I have committed the conduct 
alleged and I am guilty of the crime(s) for which my plea(s) is/are entered. 
13. My plea(s) o^tguilty) (no contest) (is) (is not) the result of a plea bargain 
between myself and the proseeuting attorney. The promises, duties and provisions of this 
plea bargain, if any, are fully contained in the Plea Agreement attached to this affidavit. 
14. I know and understand that if I desire to withdraw my plea(s) of/fguilty) (no 
contest), I must do so by filing a motion within thirty (30) days after entry of my plea. 
15. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or recommendation of 
probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing made or 
sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not biding on the judge. I 
also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they believe the Court may do are 
also not binding on the Court. 
16. No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind have been made to 
induce me to plead guilty, and no promises except those contained herein and in the attached 
plea agreement, have been made to me. 
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17. I have read this statement or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I 
understand its provisions. I know that I am free to change or delete anything contained in 
this statement. I do not wish to make any changes because all of the statements are correct. 
18. I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. . *. , 
19. I am os / years of age; I have attended school through the \<s grade and 
I can read and understand the English language or an interpreter has been provided to me. I 
was not under the influence of any drugs, medication or intoxicants which would impair my 
judgment when the decision was made to enter the plea(s). I am not presently under the 
influence of any drug, medication or intoxicants which impair my judgment. 
20. I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind, mentally capable of 
understanding the proceedings and the consequences of my plea and free of any mental 
disease, defect or impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently and 
voluntarily entering my plea. ^ \ 
DATED this fO day of /[gjAUL . 19J24 
IMU& (ULS, 
DEFEND Al 
CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY 
j/hLUy C{ t &&1U?LL& the defendant I certify that I am the attorney for, 
above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her and I 
have discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its 
contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, 
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the 
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defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated and these, along with the other representa-
tions and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true. 
' &p 'UL Tb- IJJJM* _ ^ ^ 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT/BAR # 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
/ y J certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against / / / / u ^'X 
^ ^ C ^ * - * ^ ^ I have reviewed this statement of the defendant and find that 
the declaration, including the elements of the offense of the charge(s) and the factual synopsis 
of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense are true and correct. No 
improper inducements, threats or coercion to encourage a plea have been offered defendant. 
The plea negotiations are fully contained in the statement and in the attached plea agreement 
or as supplemented on record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the 
evidence would support the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) 
is/are entered and the acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public irrtf 
yf^t^ Wsx^<^ 
PROSECUTING ATTQKNEY/BAR # 
£ 
ORDER 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing statement and the certification of the 
defendant and counsel, the Court witnesses the signatures and firms the defendant's plea(s) of 
(guilty) (no contest) is freely and voluntarily made and it is so ordered that the defendant's 
plea(s) of (guilty) (no contest) to the charge(s) set fortlyn the statement be accepted and 
entered. 
DONE IN COURT this ?7 day of /W^+>€~ 19_ 
t^__ 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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ADDENDUM C 
LEGISLATIVE FLOOR DEBATE ON 
HOUSE BILL 3 
Laws of Utah 1976, Ch. 9, § 1 
(Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203) 
SENATE DEBATE 
SENATE BUDGET SESSION 
DAY 15—JANUARY 26, 1976 
SENATOR RINSTROM'S SECOND AMENDMENT TO HOUSE BILL 3 
Sen. Rinstrom: 
Mr. President: 
Sen. Rinstrom: 
Now, Mr. President, a second motion I would 
have to amend this bill as follows is again 
in those same places, calling your attention 
to line 18 after the word "firearm," add 
these words: "or a facsimile or the 
representation of the same was used in the 
commission or furtherance of a felony." 
Or a facsimile or what? 
"or a facsimile or the representation of the 
same." Now, let me give you the example of 
where I'm going. Sorry to report I 
represented a young man on an armed robbery 
charge. I was successful in finding him 
innocent. He later was arrested on a second 
one and confessed to eighteen armed robberies 
including the one that I had represented him 
on, and he'd all done it with a cap pistol. 
But the people at the other end of that 
barrel didn't know what they were facing, and 
they were just as in great a shock and trauma 
as if a real gun had been pointed to them. 
So I think that we ought to include a 
facsimile. Or, this would also include the 
man who has his hand in his pocket and points 
it at you and says, "I have a gun here, and 
if you don't hand over the cash, I'm going to 
shoot you." So, what this amendment would do 
is saying that if a person uses a gun, its 
facsimile, or represents that he has a 
firearm, he could equally be sentenced to an 
additional five years. That's the purpose of 
the amendment. 
Mr. President: Senator Brockbank. 
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Sen. Brockbank: 
Mr. President: 
(inaudible) representation of same to 
representation of a firearm. 
That's good. That's a good suggestion. 
Sen. Brockbank: 
Mr. President: 
Sen. Brockbank: 
Sen. Rinstrom: 
Mr. President: 
Sen. Rinstrom: 
Mr. President: 
Sen. Rinstrom: 
Mr. President: 
Sen. Rinstrom: 
Mr. President: 
Sen. Rinstrom: 
Mr. President: 
Sen. Rinstrom: 
Because I think you might refer back to a 
facsimile. 
That's right. That's right. 
(inaudible) to firearms. 
And the representation of a firearm. 
And that will also have to go into all three 
places? 
That's correct. 
Okay. That carries a bit more significance 
than the other one, I would think, if it 
(inaudible) some gesture on the part of the 
person as opposed to carrying a real firearm. 
I might say that this bill does not deal just 
with robberies. It's the commission of any 
felony in which a firearm would be used, a 
facsimile or the representation. 
Would this be a representation. 
I don't think if you pointed your finger at 
me that that would be a representation. 
But— 
It might look like a gun— 
Well-
to somebody in the dark. 
I think a reasonable man, if he was seeing 
that, would not conclude that you had a 
firearm. If you came up behind me at night 
and stuck your finger in your back and said, 
"This is a gun. If you don't hand me your 
wallet, I'm going to shoot you,11 that would 
be a representation, yes. 
2 
Mr. President: Any further discussion on the motion? All in 
favor of the motion say, "aye.11 
Body: Aye. 
Mr. President: Opposed, "no.11 
Body: No. 
Mr. President: The motion carries. If there are no further 
questions, then I have a question I want to 
ask you, but before I do, Senator Howell. 
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ADDENDUM D 
HOUSE DEBATE 
LEGISLATIVE BUDGET SESSION 
DAY 16—JANUARY 27, 1976 
REPRESENTATIVE HANSEN'S EXPLANATION OF SENATE AMENDMENT AND HOUSE 
ADOPTION OF AMENDMENT 
Mr. Speaker: 
Rep. Hansen: 
Representative Hansen, Dave Hansen, we have 
here a communication from the Senate 
regarding House Bill No. 3, and it appears 
that they have made some amendments. Have 
you had a chance to look at those? We can 
pass it if you have not. 
Mr. Speaker, I have had the opportunity to 
look at those. I think it strengthens the 
bill. I would move that the House accept 
that. 
Mr. Speaker: 
Rep. Hansen: 
Secretary: 
Mr. Speaker: 
Rep. Hansen: 
Okay. Let's read the communication, then 
I'll recognize the motion. 
Thank you. 
Mr. Speaker, I am directed to inform your 
honorable body that the Senate has this day 
passed, as amended by the Senate under 
suspension of the rules, House Bill 3, 
increase in sentence, by Mr. Jones, 
Mr. Salas, et al. and the same is returned 
herewith for your further action (inaudible) 
Representatives, I'll call your attention to 
the goldenrod copy of House Bill 3 which 
you'll find in your book. The goldenrod copy 
contains the amendments made by the Senate to 
the Bill. If you'll take a look at that, 
please. The communication from the Senate 
indicates they're sending the Bill in its 
amended form. Representative Hansen. 
Mr. Speaker, I've reviewed this and what, in 
effect, it is, if you use a facsimile of a 
gun or you put your finger in the back of 
someone and say it is a gun or hold your coat 
or something similar to that, the same 
sentence could be imposed upon a felon who 
did that. I think it's effect strengthens 
the Bill and I would make the motion that we 
accept the amendment of the Senate. 
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Mr. Speaker: 
Body: 
Mr. Speaker: 
Body: 
Mr. Speaker: 
The motion is that we concur with the Senate 
amendment. The motion has been seconded. Is 
there any discussion? Seeing no further 
discussion, all in favor say "aye." 
Aye. 
Any opposed, "no." 
(none) 
The motion is carried and we have concurred. 
And now, Representatives, it becomes 
necessary for us to vote again on the Bill as 
passed by the Senate and with the amendments. 
We can do that now. House Bill 3. Okay, 
Representatives, I'm going to open voting on 
House Bill 3. This is a bill that we've 
debated in the past. The Senate has amended 
it. We've just accepted sentence amendments. 
And so, voting is open on House Bill 3, if 
you would. (inaudible) has voted on House 
Bill 3 and therefore voting is closed. House 
Bill 3, having received fifty yes votes and 
three no votes, has again passed, will be 
returned now to the Senate for the signature 
of the President of the Senate. 
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